ARE TRUMP AND XI PREPARED TO HAVE THE RIGHT CONVERSATION?
Taiwan, Iran, AI, the Arctic and fair trade are no longer separate issues
China has reportedly warned the United States that it could cancel President Xi Jinping’s planned meeting with President Donald Trump if Washington approves additional arms sales to Taiwan.
This comes at a moment when artificial intelligence is transforming economic power, manufacturing, national defense and the relationships between nations.
In “Is AI Moving Too Fast?”, my Civiltalk partner Rick Fiorito raises a question that reaches far beyond the technology itself:
Are the leaders of our companies—and the leaders of our world—having the right conversations about AI at this critical time?
Learning to use conversational AI is only part of the challenge. Leaders must also develop the conversational intelligence required to understand competing interests, identify red lines, recognize opportunities and negotiate better outcomes.
The planned Trump–Xi meeting could become one of the most visible and consequential examples of that need.
China’s warning is intended to pressure Trump. But it also reveals something important: preventing further American arms sales to Taiwan matters greatly to Xi.
Trump loves leverage. His response should not be to give away that leverage before the meeting. It should be to ask: “If stopping new arms sales to Taiwan is so important to China, what is China prepared to do in return?”
The answer could become much larger than Taiwan. Trump has an opportunity to place four major issues on the table:
A verifiable guarantee of peace and continued self-government for Taiwan.
Chinese cooperation in isolating Iran and ending its ability to finance aggression.
An end to Chinese backdoor access to the American market through Canada and Mexico, followed by fair and reciprocal trade.
A secure Western Hemisphere in which Venezuela and Cuba cannot become strategic platforms for China or Russia.
If negotiated carefully, such an agreement could protect Taiwan, weaken Iran, secure the semiconductor and AI supply chains, strengthen the democratic Arctic and help rebuild the relationship between the United States and Canada.
These are not separate conversations. Taiwan’s advanced chips, North American energy, Arctic critical minerals, Chinese manufacturing practices, Iranian aggression and the future of AI are now deeply connected.
FIRST: PROTECT TAIWAN AND THE WORLD’S SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPLY
China considers Taiwan its most important red line. The United States, meanwhile, supplies Taiwan with defensive weapons under the Taiwan Relations Act and maintains the capacity to resist force or coercion against the island.
Trump has already described arms sales as a negotiating chip. But the United States should never surrender that chip in exchange for a vague promise.
China will not formally recognize Taiwan’s independence. That would contradict Beijing’s longstanding position and make an agreement impossible.
The achievable objective is therefore not a change in Taiwan’s formal status. It is a binding guarantee of Taiwan’s continued peaceful self-government. China would commit that it will not:
Invade Taiwan.
Impose a blockade or quarantine.
Seize Taiwanese territory.
Interrupt civilian shipping or aviation.
Use cyberattacks against Taiwan’s government or critical infrastructure.
Attempt to end Taiwan’s democratic self-government through military or economic coercion.
China should also reduce military exercises and missile deployments around the Taiwan Strait and accept a verification and crisis-communication process.
In return, the United States could conditionally pause specified new arms sales. Taiwan would retain its existing defenses, and previously approved commitments would not simply disappear.
Most importantly, the pause would be temporary, reviewable and reversible.
If China violated the agreement, American arms sales would immediately resume—and could increase.
This would give Xi something he wants while giving Taiwan something far more important: greater security from invasion or blockade.
It would also protect a semiconductor supply chain on which China, the United States and much of the world depend.
Advanced chips are now foundational to AI systems, data centers, communications, robotics, weapons and modern manufacturing.
Any serious conflict around Taiwan could close shipping lanes, stop advanced-chip production and cause a global economic and technological shock.
Preserving that production is not a favor to one country. It is a shared international interest.
Taiwan must, of course, participate in any agreement affecting its security, government or semiconductor industry. Its future cannot be negotiated solely between Washington and Beijing.
SECOND: REQUIRE CHINA TO HELP ISOLATE IRAN
The second American demand should concern Iran.
China has been Iran’s most important economic lifeline and its largest oil customer. Chinese purchases, intermediaries and barter arrangements have helped Tehran obtain revenue and goods despite American sanctions.
If Xi wants restraint on Taiwan arms sales, Trump should require meaningful Chinese cooperation against Iran. China would agree to:
Stop purchasing sanctioned Iranian oil.
Close oil-for-goods and other sanctions-evasion channels.
Prevent Chinese companies from supplying military or dual-use technology to Iran.
End any intelligence or satellite assistance supporting Iranian attacks.
Enforce sanctions against entities financing Iran’s nuclear, missile and proxy operations.
Support a verifiable diplomatic settlement.
The conditions for lifting that pressure should be based on conduct: Iran ending attacks, constraining its nuclear and missile programs, ending support for violent proxies and accepting effective international verification.
Political change within Iran may ultimately follow. But demanding that China openly support regime change would probably make cooperation impossible.
Beijing is far more likely to accept defined security conditions than an agreement explicitly requiring the removal of another government.
China would also have a legitimate question: Where would it obtain replacement energy?
That creates an opportunity rather than an obstacle.
China could replace Iranian oil through a diversified group of suppliers, including the United States, Canada, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other energy-producing countries in the Middle East and around the world.
Saudi Arabia would be especially important because of its production scale, established relationship with China and ability to serve as a stable long-term supplier.
Other Middle Eastern producers could also compete for Chinese demand under transparent commercial arrangements that do not finance Iran’s military, nuclear or proxy activities.
A diversified supply would reduce China’s dependence on Iran without making it dependent on the United States or any other single producer.
It would also give American, Canadian, Saudi, Venezuelan and other producers access to additional demand.
Venezuelan production and sanctions would require separate arrangements, but the broader principle is sound: China should not need Iranian oil to maintain its energy security.
Trump would not merely ask China to abandon a supplier. He would offer China a safer alternative while cutting off the revenue Iran uses to finance aggression.
THIRD: CLOSE THE CHINESE BACKDOOR INTO NORTH AMERICA
Trump’s third demand should be clear: “China cannot use Canada or Mexico as a backdoor into the United States.”
Canada and Mexico should remain free to trade with China. Sovereign nations do not need Washington’s permission to conduct ordinary international commerce. But privileged access to the American market through the USMCA cannot become a way for Chinese companies to avoid American tariffs, technology restrictions or national-security protections.
The agreement should address:
Chinese-controlled factories established primarily to export into the United States.
Transshipment and superficial relabeling of Chinese goods.
Subsidized Chinese vehicles, batteries, steel, aluminum and solar products.
Chinese components presented as Canadian or Mexican content without substantial local transformation.
Telecommunications, software, connected vehicles and digital systems capable of creating security vulnerabilities.
Ownership structures designed to conceal Chinese control.
The United States should apply transparent tests involving ownership, subsidies, strategic technology, meaningful transformation and North American value added.
This should not become an excuse to treat every Canadian or Mexican product containing an ordinary Chinese component as a national-security threat. The rules must distinguish legitimate North American manufacturing from deliberate tariff circumvention.
Once that red line is protected, the United States and China can pursue fair and reciprocal trade. The principle is simple: “China should receive transparent access to the American market under the same basic conditions American companies receive in China. Neither country should expect one-way access, hidden subsidies or permanent protection without an equivalent response.”
China can compete. It should not be permitted to evade the rules.
FOURTH: SECURE THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The American intervention in Venezuela should not be understood only as a campaign against drugs or a struggle to control oil. Drugs, sanctions and oil were real parts of the public dispute. But the deeper strategic issue was national defense and power in the Western Hemisphere.
China had become the principal destination for sanctioned Venezuelan oil and had developed an “all-weather strategic partnership” with Caracas. In December 2025, American forces intercepted the Centuries, which was carrying approximately 1.8 million barrels of Venezuelan crude bound for China. The United States later seized the Bertha, a tanker linked to a China-based management company carrying another 1.9 million barrels of Venezuelan crude to China.
Russian involvement was also visible. American forces seized the Russian-flagged tanker Marinera after it had attempted to evade the Venezuelan blockade. Other tankers had histories of Russian ownership or connections to the sanctions-evasion fleet.
These vessels were carrying oil, but the contest was about much more than individual cargoes.
China and Russia were demonstrating their ability to finance, supply and protect an anti-American government in the Caribbean and northern South America.
Venezuela’s location, oil, ports, minerals and relationship with Cuba gave that alignment strategic significance close to the United States.
The larger American objective was to make clear that Venezuela and Cuba could not be purchased, financed or manipulated into becoming permanent Chinese or Russian strategic platforms in the Western Hemisphere.
That does not mean the United States should own those countries, choose their governments indefinitely or deny them sovereignty. It means Washington will resist efforts by hostile powers to acquire control over strategically important ports, energy systems, telecommunications, intelligence facilities, critical minerals or military access close to the American homeland.
Cuba makes the national-security concern especially clear. American officials have said China operates intelligence facilities on the island, only about 90 miles from Florida.
Russia has also maintained a long political, military and intelligence relationship with Havana.
The message should therefore be: “Venezuela and Cuba should be sovereign and prosperous. They should be free to trade with the world. But they cannot become forward operating platforms through which China or Russia threatens the United States and the rest of the democratic Western Hemisphere.”
American policy should offer a constructive alternative: lawful energy and mineral investment, infrastructure, jobs, trade and economic integration with neighboring democracies.
Countries should not be forced to choose poverty or dependence on China and Russia. They should have access to a fairer and more prosperous relationship with the United States and its allies.
This connects Venezuela directly to the larger strategy.
The United States is protecting its southern approaches while working with Canada, Greenland, Denmark and Europe to protect the Arctic and northern approaches.
Together, those policies establish a secure democratic perimeter—not for conquest, but to negotiate from strength and create the conditions for fair trade and peace.
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CANADA
This larger agreement could also help repair the badly strained relationship between the United States and Canada—and help Canada become the Arctic power that North America and NATO need.
Canada has spent too much of the current dispute debating individual protections involving dairy, alcohol, procurement and other politically sensitive sectors.
Those issues matter, but they are small compared with the strategic opportunity before both countries.
Canada possesses many of the resources China needs: oil, natural gas, uranium, potash, timber, agricultural products and critical minerals.
Increased Canadian energy exports could help replace Iranian supplies while generating Canadian income and employment.
But Canada’s strategic value is larger than its resources. It controls an enormous portion of the Arctic, where Russia has spent years expanding its military presence, ports, airfields, icebreakers and northern infrastructure.
Canada should use the income, investment and renewed continental partnership created by a broader agreement to become a genuine peer competitor to Russia in the Arctic.
That means sustained Canadian investment in:
Arctic ports, airfields, roads and communications.
Icebreakers, submarines, patrol aircraft and surveillance drones.
Satellites, over-the-horizon radar and early-warning systems.
Permanent northern military and search-and-rescue capacity.
Energy and critical-mineral projects developed with Indigenous ownership and participation.
A Canadian defense-industrial base capable of supplying both Canada and its NATO allies.
The objective would not be for Canada to compete with Russia alone. It would be for Canada to carry its proper share of defending the northern approaches to North America while working with the United States through NORAD and helping European allies strengthen NATO’s northern flank.
For years, the United States has shouldered a disproportionate share of continental and alliance defense. A stronger Canada would change that relationship. Canada would no longer receive privileged economic access while relying primarily on the United States to fund and provide its security. It would become a capable, sovereign defense partner investing in the protection of its own territory and contributing meaningful capacity to the wider alliance.
That would reposition Canada from a source of American concern to an essential part of the solution.
Canada could tell the United States: “We will help protect the integrity of the North American market. We will prevent Chinese transshipment and apply strong safeguards to strategic technology and Chinese-controlled production. We will help replace Iranian energy, build the infrastructure needed to defend the Arctic and invest properly in our own defense. In return, let us restore fair, reciprocal and dependable trade between our countries.”
The United States would gain a stronger continental partner capable of helping defend the Arctic. Europe would gain a more capable NATO ally on the alliance’s northern frontier. Canada would gain renewed access, investment and greater demand for its resources. China would gain diversified energy supplies. Iran would lose its largest economic lifeline.
Canada would remain completely sovereign. It could continue trading with Europe, Asia and other allies.
The restriction would be narrow and reasonable: privileged Canadian access to the United States cannot become privileged Chinese access disguised as Canadian production.
A UNITED DEMOCRATIC ARCTIC
At the same time, the United States should work with Canada, Denmark, Greenland and its European allies to create a coherent democratic Arctic strategy.
Greenland is self-governing within the Kingdom of Denmark, and its people must determine its future. The American objective should not be to control Greenland. It should be to build a deeper partnership with Greenland and Denmark based on consent, investment, security and mutual benefit.
Together, the United States, Canada, Greenland, Denmark and their European NATO partners could coordinate:
Arctic surveillance, radar, satellites and early warning.
Ports, airfields, icebreakers and search-and-rescue capacity.
Submarine detection and protection of northern sea lanes.
Responsible development of energy and critical minerals.
Indigenous ownership, employment and infrastructure.
Common security reviews for foreign investment in strategic assets.
Allied processing and manufacturing so Arctic resources do not simply flow into Chinese-controlled supply chains.
This would create a democratic Arctic bloc capable of deterring Russian aggression and matching Russia’s northern military presence.
But deterrence should not be the final objective. The longer-term goal should be to bring Russia into a more peaceful system of fair and reciprocal trade. Russia could benefit from legitimate Arctic commerce, shipping and resource development if it respects borders, reduces military threats and follows mutually enforced rules.
The message to Russia would be straightforward: “The democratic Arctic is united and capable of defending itself. Cooperation, trade and shared prosperity remain possible—but not through invasion, intimidation or coercion.”
This is negotiation from strength with peace as the destination.
HOLDING CHINA’S DISRUPTIVE PRACTICES AT BAY
China has described itself as a “near-Arctic state” and has pursued access to northern minerals, shipping routes, infrastructure and research.
China should be permitted to participate in legitimate, transparent commerce. But it should not be allowed to gain strategic control over Arctic ports, communications, critical minerals or dual-use infrastructure. The same principle should apply to manufacturing throughout North America and Europe.
China’s state subsidies, excess industrial capacity and below-market financing can overwhelm domestic producers before normal market forces have time to respond. Chinese companies should not be able to use investments in Canada, Mexico, Greenland or Europe to disguise ownership, avoid tariffs or export subsidized overcapacity into allied markets.
As I argued in “My Canada and US Trade War Prediction,” the danger is not limited to automobiles. It extends to batteries, drones, humanoid robots, telecommunications equipment, AI infrastructure and connected technologies incorporating cameras, microphones, mapping systems, cloud connections and remotely updated software.
A product assembled in Canada or Mexico does not become strategically Canadian or Mexican if its ownership, essential technology, software, data systems and supply chain remain controlled by China. The democratic allies should establish common rules covering:
Beneficial ownership and state control.
Government subsidies and below-market financing.
Strategic technology and data security.
Critical-mineral extraction, refining and processing.
Meaningful local production and value added.
Reciprocal access for Western companies inside China.
This is not an argument for cutting China out of the global economy. It is an argument for containing disruptive practices and requiring China to participate under fair, reciprocal and transparent rules.
China can trade with North America and Europe. It cannot be permitted to exploit differences among allied countries, dominate strategic supply chains or destroy competing industries through subsidized production and indirect market access.
THE LARGER BARGAIN
This negotiation should also be understood within an even larger national purpose. In “Unite Us Again with a Shared National Purpose,” I argued that the convergence of AI, robotics, advanced semiconductors, data centers, energy and critical minerals could become America’s next great resource boom. That prosperity should strengthen the nation and benefit current and future generations rather than merely concentrating wealth among the owners of technology and capital.
The international strategy described here supports that purpose.
Securing chips, energy, minerals, trade routes and allied manufacturing protects the physical foundation on which the AI economy will be built.
Fair and reciprocal trade can ensure that the United States and its allies continue innovating without allowing state-subsidized competitors to dismantle the industrial capacity on which their security depends.
The structure of the agreement could be summarized simply -
CHINA PROVIDES:
Peace and continued self-government for Taiwan.
Protection of the global semiconductor supply chain.
Real economic pressure on Iran.
No circumvention of American trade rules through Canada or Mexico.
Fair and reciprocal access for American businesses.
THE UNITED STATES PROVIDES:
A conditional and reversible pause on specified new Taiwan arms sales.
Fair and transparent market access for legitimate Chinese trade.
Support for diversified energy supplies from the United States, Canada, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, other Middle Eastern producers and additional reliable suppliers.
A clear path toward a more stable economic relationship if China complies.
CANADA AND MEXICO PROVIDE:
Stronger rules of origin and enforcement against transshipment.
Protection of strategic North American supply chains and digital infrastructure.
Legitimate energy, resource and manufacturing partnerships that do not serve as channels for Chinese circumvention.
CANADA ADDITIONALLY PROVIDES:
Sustained investment in its own defense and NATO commitments.
The infrastructure and military capacity to help deter Russia in the Arctic.
Stronger protection of North America alongside the United States through NORAD.
Energy, critical minerals and defense production supporting both the United States and Europe.
THE WIDER DEMOCRATIC ARCTIC PARTNERSHIP PROVIDES:
Coordinated defense among the United States, Canada, Greenland, Denmark and European NATO allies.
Secure northern infrastructure and responsible resource development.
Common safeguards against Chinese control of strategic Arctic assets and supply chains.
A position of strength from which to offer Russia a path toward peace and reciprocal trade.
THE DEMOCRATIC WESTERN HEMISPHERE PROVIDES:
Protection against Chinese or Russian control of strategic ports, infrastructure and intelligence facilities.
Lawful alternatives to sanctions evasion and authoritarian dependence.
Energy, mineral and manufacturing partnerships based on sovereignty and reciprocity.
A secure southern counterpart to the allied defense of the Arctic.
This would not resolve every disagreement. Nor should the United States trust promises without verification. Every concession should depend upon measurable compliance, regular review and automatic consequences for violations.
The opportunity is real.
Xi wants to stop additional American arms sales to Taiwan. Trump should treat that desire as leverage—not as a favor to grant before negotiations begin.
He should ask China to help deliver four outcomes that would benefit the United States and its allies:
PEACE FOR TAIWAN.
PRESSURE ON IRAN.
NO CHINESE BACKDOOR THROUGH CANADA OR MEXICO.
A SECURE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.
In exchange, China could receive alternative energy, conditional restraint on new arms sales, and fair and reciprocal trade.
That would be more than a summit announcement.
It could become the foundation of a new strategic relationship—one that advances American security, protects Taiwan, gives China a peaceful path forward and creates an opportunity to bring the United States and Canada back to the table.
It could also help Canada become what geography requires it to be: a leading democratic Arctic power, a peer competitor to Russia in the North, a full partner of the United States in continental defense and a stronger contributor to NATO’s security in Europe.
Working with Greenland, Denmark and Europe, the United States and Canada could build a united allied Arctic capable of deterring Russia, protecting strategic resources and holding China’s disruptive industrial practices at bay—while leaving both China and Russia a clear path into fair, reciprocal trade and, ultimately, peace.
This is the larger lesson of Rick Fiorito’s question about whether AI is moving too fast - Technology is advancing faster than the conversations governing it.
The challenge is not only whether nations can build better AI, faster robots, more powerful chips, larger data centers and more advanced weapons. The challenge is whether their leaders can conduct the conversations required to prevent those capabilities from producing confrontation, economic disruption and war.
The Trump–Xi meeting should therefore not be limited to a transactional argument about the next Taiwan weapons package.
It should become a conversation about the complete system: Taiwan, AI, semiconductors, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, energy, North American trade, Arctic security, manufacturing and peace.
Important conversations occur every day in our families, organizations, companies and governments.
But few conversations will be more visible—or carry greater consequences for future generations—than this one.
At Civiltalk, we believe better conversations lead to stronger relationships and better outcomes. That principle applies to individuals. It applies to companies. And it applies to nations.
The world’s leaders are developing extraordinary artificial intelligence. Now they must demonstrate the conversational intelligence to use it wisely.
Let’s Clarion This.
Is AI Moving Too Fast?
https://www.civiltalk.com/articles/is-ai-moving-too-fast
My Canada and US Trade War Prediction
https://www.civiltalk.com/articles/my-canada-and-us-trade-war-prediction
Unite Us Again with a Shared National Purpose
https://www.civiltalk.com/articles/911-norways-oil-fund-and-an-american-future-fund