Can America Deter Three Regional Threats Alone? - A Circle Conversation
A Primer for Your CivilTalk Circle
The purpose of every CivilTalk Circle is the human exchange: people stating positions, asking each other questions, listening to someone they may disagree with, and working to understand the how and why behind different points of view. The conversation is guided by a moderator and observed by Clarion CI, which helps make the dynamics of the conversation visible—where participants agree, where they differ, how effectively they listen and respond, and the conversational intelligence skills demonstrated along the way.
What follows is not intended to tell participants what to think. It is a primer for the Circle conversation—background, evidence, differing perspectives, and questions designed to help participants arrive informed and prepared to have a better conversation.
The Conversation: How Much Can America Do Alone?
A single country can often make and execute a military decision faster than a coalition. Allies can bring enormous additional resources, geographic advantages, industrial capacity, intelligence, and military forces. But turning those resources into coordinated action requires preparation, political agreement, interoperability, and trust.
That distinction matters when the United States is considering security challenges in several regions at the same time:
Russia and European security.
China, North Korea, and Indo-Pacific security.
Security, infrastructure, trade routes, and outside influence in the Western Hemisphere.
The United States still spends more on its military than any other individual country. But it also maintains global responsibilities.
That creates the central question for this Circle: How can America maintain credible deterrence in Europe, the Pacific, and its own hemisphere without capable and coordinated partners?
Start With the Numbers—but Understand What They Mean
The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates 2025 defense spending at approximately:
United States: $921 billion
Russia: $186.2 billion at market exchange rates—or approximately $523.6 billion when adjusted for purchasing power
China: $251.3 billion at market exchange rates—or approximately $531.4 billion when adjusted for purchasing power
The purchasing-power estimates attempt to account for the fact that Russia and China can purchase some military labor, equipment, and services domestically at lower costs than a simple currency conversion suggests.
Using those IISS purchasing-power estimates, Russia and China together represent roughly $1.055 trillion in equivalent purchasing power, compared with the $921 billion U.S. budget.
That comparison is useful—but it needs an important qualification.
A purchasing-power estimate is not the same measurement as a nominal defense budget. Adding the Russian and Chinese estimates also does not create a single combined military force.
China and Russia have different militaries, geographic priorities, command structures, capabilities, alliances, and strategic interests.
Military spending also does not tell us everything about readiness, technology, training, logistics, nuclear forces, intelligence, geography, or the ability to project power.
So the numbers should begin the discussion—not end it.
Europe: Spending Must Become Readiness
Europe has substantial financial resources and has sharply increased military spending in recent years.
SIPRI estimates total European military spending reached approximately $864 billion in 2025, an increase of about 14% from the previous year. That regional total includes Russia and countries outside NATO, so it should not be treated as NATO-Europe spending alone.
Russia spent approximately $190 billion at market exchange rates under SIPRI's methodology. IISS estimates its purchasing-power equivalent considerably higher, at roughly $524 billion. That difference illustrates why military budgets can be difficult to compare. European countries may collectively possess greater economic resources, but money alone does not create immediate military capability.
The practical questions involve:
Ammunition.
Air and missile defense.
Trained personnel.
Transportation and logistics.
Intelligence and communications.
Industrial production capacity.
And the ability of different national forces to operate together.
The United States remains a central part of NATO's military deterrence. Stronger European capabilities could allow European countries to assume more responsibility for regional defense while giving the United States greater flexibility to address simultaneous demands elsewhere. That makes defense spending targets useful milestones.
It is the ability to deploy and sustain effective forces is the result that ultimately matters.
The Pacific: Partners Face a Different Challenge
The Indo-Pacific presents a different security structure. Unlike Europe, there is no single NATO-style alliance linking all major U.S. partners in the region. SIPRI estimates 2025 military spending at approximately:
Japan: $62.2 billion
South Korea: $47.8 billion
Australia: $35.3 billion
Taiwan: $18.2 billion
China spent approximately $336 billion under SIPRI's market-exchange-rate methodology. Japan's spending increased 9.7% during the year, while Taiwan's increased approximately 14%.
The countries facing security challenges in the region also have different circumstances.
Japan and Australia are U.S. treaty allies.
South Korea must consider both regional competition with China and the direct military threat from North Korea.
Taiwan is not a U.S. treaty ally and occupies a different legal and strategic position.
The Philippines is also a U.S. treaty ally and plays an increasingly important geographic role.
Simply adding their military budgets therefore creates only a rough illustration of available resources.
A more important question is: How well could these countries work together during a crisis?
That involves shared intelligence, compatible communications and weapons, joint exercises, logistics, access to bases, transportation, stockpiles, and agreed plans for rapid action.
The Trump administration has explicitly argued that greater allied responsibility in Europe could allow the United States to concentrate more resources on the Indo-Pacific. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth described the Indo-Pacific as the U.S. military's “priority theater” and called for allies to increase their defense contributions.
That provides one rationale for asking allies to do more.
The question for the Circle is whether increased spending is translating into enough usable regional capability.
The Western Hemisphere: Security Starts Closer to Home
The third part of the discussion is closer to the United States. SIPRI estimates 2025 military expenditures of approximately:
Canada: $37.5 billion
Mexico: $13.6 billion
Brazil: $23.9 billion
Colombia: $14.5 billion
These countries are not members of one common military alliance.
Their defense budgets serve very different purposes, including territorial defense, domestic security, maritime security, counter-narcotics operations, peacekeeping, and—in Canada's case—NATO responsibilities. So adding the budgets together does not tell us how much military capability is available for a common regional mission.
But there is a broader strategic question. Security in the Western Hemisphere can include:
Maritime routes.
Ports and transportation infrastructure.
Critical minerals and energy.
Cybersecurity.
Organized crime and trafficking networks.
Foreign military or strategic influence.
Approaches to the United States itself.
The Trump administration has explicitly connected Western Hemisphere security with its broader deterrence strategy. In his 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue remarks, Defense Secretary Hegseth said the United States was increasing its focus on security in the hemisphere while also reorienting toward deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
That raises another Circle question: How much responsibility should countries in the Americas share for protecting the security and resilience of the hemisphere?
Supply Chains Are Part of Deterrence
Military forces cannot operate indefinitely if essential materials become unavailable. Modern defense depends on much more than soldiers, ships, aircraft, and missiles. It also requires:
Energy.
Critical minerals.
Semiconductors.
Communications technology.
Transportation networks.
Shipbuilding.
Manufacturing capacity.
Replacement parts and ammunition.
This is where economic policy and national security increasingly intersect. A country can contribute to collective security through military forces. But it can also contribute through reliable energy supplies, mineral processing, semiconductor manufacturing, shipyards, transportation infrastructure, and industrial production. That creates an important distinction between efficiency during normal times and resilience during a crisis.
The least expensive supplier may not always be the most dependable supplier when geopolitical relationships deteriorate. Diversification can provide more options. But diversification can also create new dependencies.
That leads to a useful question: Does a particular trade or supply-chain relationship give the United States and its partners more choices during a crisis—or fewer?
How the Trump Administration Connects the Pieces
The Trump administration has explicitly linked greater allied defense contributions to America's ability to address threats in multiple regions.
In Europe, the administration has pushed NATO members to assume more responsibility for their own defense.
In the Indo-Pacific, it has called for greater allied investment and closer defense cooperation.
At the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue, Defense Secretary Hegseth argued that as European allies assume more responsibility, the United States can devote greater attention to the Indo-Pacific. He also emphasized stronger cooperation and greater defense investment among Asian partners.
In a meeting with Australia, for example, Hegseth called for increased Australian defense spending while also discussing industrial-base cooperation, supply-chain resilience, force posture, and joint production of long-range weapons.
These policies did not begin entirely with the current administration. Many allied modernization programs, defense partnerships, and efforts to strengthen supply chains predate President Trump's return to office.
The question therefore should not simply be whether pressure is occurring. It should be: Is it producing durable additional capability, coordination, and resilience?
One Budget, Multiple Responsibilities
This may be the most important point in the entire discussion.
The United States has one military establishment and one defense budget supporting worldwide responsibilities. The same forces cannot automatically be assumed to be fully available for Europe, fully available for the Indo-Pacific, and fully available for the Western Hemisphere at the same time.
Aircraft move.
Ships move.
Ammunition is consumed.
Maintenance takes time.
Personnel deployments have limits.
Industrial capacity cannot instantly replace everything used during a conflict. That makes allied capability particularly important when planners consider the possibility of simultaneous crises.
But there is another perspective worth examining. The United States also possesses capabilities that budget comparisons alone do not capture: global bases, nuclear forces, advanced technology, intelligence networks, logistics infrastructure, alliances, naval reach, and decades of experience operating forces around the world.
So the question is not simply: “Does America spend enough?”
It is: “What combination of American capability, allied capability, coordination, and industrial capacity produces credible deterrence across several regions at once?”
The Better Conversation
Discussions about alliances can quickly become arguments over whether other countries are “paying their fair share.” That is only one part of the issue. A more useful CivilTalk Circle can ask:
What capabilities does the United States actually need from its partners?
What should allies be capable of doing without immediate American intervention?
Which American capabilities are difficult for allies to replace?
Where would greater coordination matter more than additional spending?
What supply chains could become vulnerabilities during a prolonged crisis?
And what evidence would demonstrate that burden sharing is actually improving deterrence?
Participants may reach very different conclusions. Some may argue that stronger allies allow the United States to preserve its global leadership while reducing the strain on American forces. Others may worry that pressing allies too aggressively could weaken political cohesion or create uncertainty about American commitments. Some may favor greater domestic defense spending and production. Others may emphasize diplomacy, arms control, economic engagement, or a narrower definition of America's overseas commitments.
A useful Circle should examine those choices rather than assume one approach is correct.
Prepare for Your Circle
Before the conversation, ask each participant to investigate one part of the deterrence picture.
Europe
What additional military capabilities have European countries actually created—not merely funded?Indo-Pacific
How much have Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Taiwan increased their defense capabilities, and where do important gaps remain?Western Hemisphere
Which security challenges genuinely require greater regional military or security cooperation?Military readiness
What matters more than spending when evaluating the ability of forces to respond quickly?Defense industry
Can the United States and its allies produce enough ammunition, ships, aircraft, missiles, drones, and replacement equipment during a prolonged crisis?Supply chains
Which critical minerals, technologies, energy sources, or manufacturing inputs create strategic vulnerabilities?
Ask each participant to bring:
One verified example of progress.
One unresolved weakness.
One question the available evidence does not yet answer.
Identify the source and date. And distinguish clearly between: Money budgeted. Money spent. Equipment ordered. Equipment delivered. Forces actually ready to deploy.
Those are not the same thing.
Questions for Your CivilTalk Circle
What should allies contribute beyond higher military spending—forces, bases, intelligence, manufacturing capacity, logistics, energy, or critical resources?
Which coordination problems could prevent allied resources from becoming usable military strength during a crisis?
Should the United States expect European allies to assume greater responsibility for deterring Russia so America can devote more resources to the Indo-Pacific?
How should we measure whether increased allied military spending is actually improving deterrence?
Which essential supply chains require domestic American capacity, and which can safely depend on trusted allies and partners?
When does diversifying suppliers reduce vulnerability, and when might it simply create a different dependency?
What should Western Hemisphere partners contribute to regional security beyond traditional military spending?
How much does America's network of alliances compensate for having military responsibilities in several regions simultaneously?
What risks could come from asking allies to assume substantially greater responsibility for their own defense?
What evidence over the next several years would increase—or decrease—your confidence that the United States and its partners can deter multiple regional threats at the same time?
One Circle Practice: Separate Resources From Capability
During the discussion, whenever someone cites a dollar amount, ask: “What capability does that spending actually provide?” A larger budget does not automatically mean a stronger military. A smaller budget does not automatically mean a weaker one.
Ask participants to move from the number to what it represents:
What was purchased?
Is it operational?
Can it get where it is needed?
Can allies use it together?
Can it be sustained during a prolonged crisis?
Before disagreeing with another participant, summarize their answer in a way they recognize as fair. At the end of the Circle, record:
Where did we agree?
Where do we still disagree?
Which capabilities appear strongest?
Where are the most important vulnerabilities?
What evidence do we need to follow next?
Clarion can help make the conversation visible by identifying points made, areas of agreement and disagreement, conversational dynamics, and commitments that emerge from the discussion. Participants remain responsible for checking and evaluating the underlying facts.
Follow the Capability—and Keep Talking
Military spending matters. But money is only the beginning - Follow the spending. Measure the capability. Test the coordination. Examine the supply chains. Assess the readiness.
Identify what America must do itself—and what capable partners can do with it.
The United States does not face identical challenges in Europe, the Pacific, and the Western Hemisphere. And America's partners are not one unified military.
That is precisely why the question is worth discussing: How much security should America provide itself, how much should its partners provide, and how should they prepare to act together when deterrence matters most?
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Sources
International Institute for Strategic Studies — The Military Balance 2026: Global Defence Spending
Provides 2025 IISS defense-spending estimates and purchasing-power comparisons for the United States, China, Russia, and other major military powers.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025
Provides 2025 country and regional military-expenditure estimates using SIPRI's methodology.
U.S. Department of Defense — Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue
Explains the administration's stated connection between greater European burden sharing, Western Hemisphere security, and increased U.S. focus on Indo-Pacific deterrence.
U.S. Department of Defense — U.S.-Australia Defense Discussions
Provides an example of the administration connecting higher allied defense spending with industrial cooperation, force posture, and supply-chain resilience.
Military-spending figures can differ between IISS and SIPRI because the organizations use different definitions and methodologies. Purchasing-power estimates should not be treated as directly interchangeable with nominal U.S.-dollar defense budgets. Figures and developments should be checked for updates before each Circle.